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Abstract— Recently, with the support of mobile cloud compu-
ting, a large number of health-related data collected from various 
body sensor networks can be managed efficiently. However, to 
ensure data security and data privacy in cloud-integrated body 
sensor networks (C-BSN) is an important and challenging issue. 
In this paper, we present a novel secure access control mecha-
nism MC-ABE (Mask Certificate–Attribute Based Encryption) 
for cloud-integrated body sensor networks. A specific signature is 
designed to mask the plaintext, then the masked data can be se-
curely outsourced to cloud severs. An authorization certificate 
composing of the signature and related privilege items is con-
structed that is used to grant privileges to data receivers. To en-
sure security, a unique value is chosen to mask the certificate for 
each data receiver. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme 
has less computational cost and storage cost compared with other 
popular models. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Body sensor networks (BSNs) have emerged recently with 
the rapid development of wearable sensors, implantable 
sensors and short range wireless communication, which make 
pervasive healthcare monitoring and management become 
increasingly popular [1,2]. Using body sensor networks, 
health-related data of the patient can be collected and 
transferred to the healthcare staff in real time. 
With the support of mobile cloud computing, cloud-
integrated body sensor network (C-BSN) can be constructed 
[3]. In C-BSN, massive local body sensor networks are 
integrated together and mass data are collected and stored in 
cloud servers; healthcare issues will continually monitor their 
patients’ status and exchange views when it is difficult to 
make diagnosis.  
However, there are still several problems and challenges in 
C-BSN [3, 4]. For example, data security and data privacy 
must be a concern since patient-related data is private and 
sensitive. In this paper, we propose a secure data access 
control scheme named MC-ABE.  
In this paper, we propose a novel secure access control 
mechanism MC-ABE to tackle with the aforementioned 
problems. The main contributions of this paper can be 
summarized as follows: 
We construct one specific signature to CP-ABE to mask 
the plaintext, then realize secure encryption/decryption 
outsourcing. We construct the unique authentication certificate 
for each visitor, which makes the system achieve more 
effective control on malicious visitors. Our scheme takes less 
time than other compared methods to do data collecting, data 
transmission and data acquisition. 
II. RELATED WORK  
Recently, various techniques have been proposed to 
address the problems of data security and data privacy in C-
BSN. In [5], Sahai and Waters proposed the Attribute-Based 
Encryption (ABE) to realize access control on encrypted data. 
In ABE, the ciphertext’s encryption policy is associated with a 
set of attributes, and the data owner can be offline after data is 
encrypted. One year later, Goyal proposed a new type of ABE 
- key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [6]. In KP-
ABE, the ciphertext’s encryption policy is also associated with 
a set of attributes, but the attributes are organized into a tree 
structure (named access tree). The benefit of this approach is 
that a more flexible access control strategy can be attained and 
a fine-grained access control can be realized. Benthcourt 
proposed CP-ABE (ciphertext-policy attribute-based 
encryption) [7], in which the data owner constructed the 
access tree together with the visitors’ identity information. The 
user can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if attributes in his 
private key match the access tree.  Yu et al. [8] proposed the 
scheme based on KP-ABE, and combines with the two ore-
encryption. It was proved that the proposed scheme can meet 
the security requirement in cloud quite well. Similarly, Wang 
et al. proposed an access control scheme based on CP-ABE, 
which is also secure and efficient in the cloud environment [9].  
In [10], to reduce computation overhead and achieve 
secure encryption/decryption outsourcing, a portion of 
computation overhead was transferred from the data owner to 
the cloud sever. A similar method is also adopted in the work 
of Zhou [11], which proposed an efficient data management 
model to balance communication and storage overhead to 
reduce the cost of data management operations. In [12], Yao el 
al. proposed a novel access control mechanism in which data 
operation privileges are granted based on authorization 
certificates. The advantage of such mechanisms is that the 
computation cost can be decreased remarkably, since there is 
no bilinear map calculation. The disadvantage is that many of 
operations need to be handled by the data owner. In [13], the 
authors considered the problem of patient self-controlled 
access privilege to highly sensitive Personal Health 
Information. They proposed a Secure Patient-centric Access 
Control scheme which allows data requesters to have different 
access privileges based on their roles, and then assigns 
different attribute sets to them. However, they took the cloud 
server as trusted, and their scheme did not work well for user 
revocation. 
III. PRELIMINARIES  
A. Notations 
In table 1, the notations used in MC-ABE are listed. 
TABLE I.  NATIONS IN MC-ABE 
Acronym Descriptions 
DO Data Owner 
DR Data Requester/Receiver 
ESP Encryption Service Provider 
DSP Decryption Service Provider 
SSP Storage Service Provider 
TA Trust Authority 
SetS Setup Sever 
PK Public Key 
MK Master Key 
SK Secret Key 
M Plaintext 
CT Ciphertext 
T Access Tree 
MM Masked Plaintext 
Cert Authorization Certificate 
MValue Mask Value 
MCert Masked Cert 
B. Basics 
1) Bilinear Pairing 
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of 
prime order p. Let g be a generator of G1 and e be a bilinear 
map, e: G1 × G1 →G2. For , pa b Z , the bilinear map e has 
the following properties [3]: 
1. Bilinearity:  for all 1,u v G 1,u v G , we 
have ( , )a be u v ( , )abe u v . 
2. Non-degeneracy: ( , ) 1e g g  . 
3. Symmetric: ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a b ab b ae g g e g g e g g  . 
2) Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem 
Definition 1: Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem 
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p 
and g be its generator, for all pZ  , given ,g g as input, 
output . 
The DL assumption holds in G if it is computationally in-
feasible to solve the DL problem in G [14]. 
C. Access Structure 
The access structure in CP-ABE is the tree-structure, 
which is named as access tree [2]. For the access tree T, the leaf 
nodes are associated with descriptive attributes; each interior 
node is a relation function, such as AND (n of n), OR (1of n), 
n of m (m>n).  
Each DR has a set of attributes, which are associated with 
DR's SK. If DR’s attributes set satisfies the access tree, the 
encrypted data can be decrypted by DR’s SK. 
D. Assumption 
In this work, we make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1: service providers (ESP, DSP, SSP) are 
semi-trusted. That is, they will follow our proposed protocol in 
general, but try to find out as much secret information as 
possible.  
Assumption 2: SetS and TA are trusted. On no conditions 
will they leak information about data and related keys. 
In order to deduce more information about encrypted data, 
service providers might combine their information to perform 
collusion attack. In our scheme, collusions between service 
providers are taken into consideration. 
IV. MC-ABE 
A. Overview 
Our proposed scheme MC-ABE is shown in figure 2. 
Seven algorithms are included in MC-ABE: Setup, EncryptDO, 
EncryptESP, KeyGen, CerGen, DecryptDSP, DecryptDR. 
For data outsourcing, DO encrypts M with algorithm 
EncryptDO, in which a signature is used to mask M. Then ESP 
encrypts T with the algorithm EncryptESP to finish the 
encryption. The encrypted data is stored in SSP. 
ESP DSP
SSP
DR
TASetS
DO
 
Fig. 1. System model 
For data access, when DR requests data from SSP, the 
request is sent to TA after verification. TA chooses a unique 
value to the mask certificate for DR. Then, TA computes SK 
with the algorithm KeyGen. After that, SK is sent to DSP and 
the certificate is sent to DR. At the same time, SSP sends the 
CT to DSP. With SK and CT, DSP can do decryption and get 
M, which is masked by the signature. Once DR receives the 
certificate, one decrypts the masked certificate with his unique 
value (TA sends the unique value to this DR when the first 
authorized request occurs. It will be used in the following 
requests until this DR is revoked) to get the certificate. Using 
the certificate, DR can decrypt the masked M with signatures 
in the certificate. 
In addition, if a DR is revoked, TA will mark the DR as 
‘revoked’ and this DR’s unique mask value will be invalid. No 
certificate will be granted to this DR any more. 
B. Two Important Notions 
1) Authorization Certificate (Cert) 
As shown in table 2, it includes five items that are 
privilege related information. DO provides the certificate 
related information to TA, then TA constructs the unique 
authorization certificate for each authorized DR. 
TABLE II.  STRUCTURE OF AUTHORIZATION CERTIFICATE 
File ID list (f1, f2…) 
Valid Period(From the start time to the end time) 
Signature ({signf1}, {signf2}…) 
Privilege ({pf1}, {pf2}…) 
PK, MK 
File ID: ID list of the authorized files. 
Valid Period: it denotes the valid period of the signature, 
from the start time to the end time. 
Signature: it is used by DO to mask the plaintext in data 
encryption; it is used by DR to get the plaintext in data 
decryption. 
Privilege: the privilege denoted by the signature such as 
read, modify, delete. 
PK, MK: These two keys are noted in table 1. 
2) Mask Value (MValue) 
The mask value is maintained by TA. For each DR, TA 
sets a unique mask value for him. The mask value is used to 
blind the authorization certificate before the certificate is sent 
to DR.  
TABLE III.  MASK VALUE TABLE (MAINTAINED BY TA) 
DRID Mask value Revocation 
DR1 MValueDR1 N 
DR2 MValueDR2 Y 
DR3 MValueDR3 N 
DRID: ID of DR. 
Mask value: unique mask value for each DR. 
Revocation: revocation mark. ‘Y’ means this DR is 
revoked. ‘N’ means this DR is authorized. 
After TA receives a data access request, it checks DRID 
firstly. If the requester is a new user, TA generates a random 
number pDRIDt Z and inserts it into the mask value table. TA 
invokes the algorithm CerGen to compute the masked 
certificate. 
Algorithm: CerGen( DRIDt ,PK)→MCert 
Construct a certificate Cert as table 2 shows. MCert is the 
masked Cert. 
Then, compute as follows: 
DRIDtMValue g  
MCert = ( , )DRIDtCert e g g = ( , ) DRIDtCert e g g   
If DR is a new user, MValue and MCert will be sent to him. 
Otherwise, send MCert to the DR. 
C. Scheme Description 
SSP
DSP
6. DecryptDSP→Masked M
DR
7.DecryptDR→M
SetS
1.Setup→PK,MK 4. CerGen→Masked Certificate
5. KeyGen→SK
TA
PK,MK
Masked M,T
CT CT
signature
SK
Masked certificate
Masked M,T
DO
2.EncryptDO→Masked M
ESP
3.EncryptESP→CT
 
Fig. 2. Algorithms implementation in MC-ABE 
The whole process of MC-ABE is shown in figure 3. In 
this section, we describe each step in detail. 
1) Data Outsourcing 
Firstly, Algorithm 1. Setup→ PK, MK 
SetS performs the algorithm. Let G0 be a multiplicative 
cyclic group of prime order p and g be its generator, and four 
random numbers , , , pZ      (Further details in [7]). 
0( , , , ( , ) , , )PK G g h g e g g g g
      
( , )MK g  
Secondly, Algorithm 2. EncryptDO(PK, M, K)→MM: 
DO implements the algorithm. 
For k K ( K is the set of operation privileges), we choose 
a random number k pv Z , and then compute the signature: 
( , ) ( , )k kv vksignature e g g e g g
   
For simplicity, let v denote the set of kv : { | }kv v k K  , 
signature denote the set of ksignature : 
{ | }ksignature signature k K  . 
Choose a random number ps Z ,then 
 ( , )asMM C M e g g signature    
              ( , ) ( , )
as vM e g g e g g     
Lastly, Algorithm 3. EncryptESP(PK, s, T, MM) [7,11]→ 
CT: 
Implemented by ESP, the access tree T is encrypted from 
the root node R to leaf nodes. For each node x in T, choose a 
polynomial qx., for node x， 
kx: the threshold value of x 
dx: the degree of qx, dx = kx -1 
parent(x): a function returns the parent node of x. 
numx: number of child nodes of x. For a child node y, y is 
uniquely identified by an index number index(y), and 1≤
index(y)≤numx 
( )(0 ) ( ( ))x parent xq q index x  
For root node R, (0)Rq s . Choose dR other points 
randomly to completely define qR. For any other node x in T, 
let ( )(0) ( ( ))x paerent xq q index x , and choose dx other points 
randomly to completely define qx. 
Y is the set of leaf nodes in T. Compute as follows: 
(0) (0)', : , ( ( ))y yq qs y yC h y Y C g C H att y      
Then,  
{ , ( , ) ( , ) , ,as v sCT T C M e g g e g g C h      
( 0 ) ( 0 )': , ( ( ))y yq qy yy Y C g C H att y    } 
CT is stored in SSP.  
2) Data Request 
When a DR requests data from SSP, TA generates SK and 
a certificate for DR. Most of the decryption cost is taken by 
DSP but DSP can not get M. Based on the effort of DSP, DR 
finishes the last step of decryption and gets M. Similar to data 
outsourcing, there are also three steps for data outsourcing. 
First, TA generates SK for DR. 
Algorithm 4. KeyGen(MK, S)→SK 
S is the attributes set of DR. We generate a random 
number pr Z , and then generate the random 
number j pr Z for each j S .Compute as follows: 
( ) /( rSK D g    ， 
      j j': ( ) ,j j
r rrj S D g H j D g     ) 
Then, TA sends SK to DSP. 
Second, DSP performs the first step of data decryption: 
decrypt the access tree in CT to get MM. 
Algorithm 5.  DecryptDSP(SK, CT)→MM 
When x is a leaf node, let i=att(x). Function att(x) denotes 
the attribute associated with the leaf node x in the tree. 
If i S , 
' '
( , )
( , , )
( , )
i x
i x
e D C
D ecryptN odeL C T SK x
e D C
  
 
( 0 ) ( 0 )
. ( 0 )
( 0 )
( ( ) , )= ( , )
( , ( ) )
x x
x
i x
q qr
r q
r q
e g H i g e g g
e g H i
   
Otherwise, 
, ( , , )i S DecryptNodeL CT SK x  . 
When x is an interior node, call the algorithm 
DecryptNodeNL(CT,SK,x). 
For all of the children z of node x, call DecryptNodeL(CT, 
SK,z), and the output is Fz. Let Sx be a kx (the threshold value 
of interior node) random set and let zF  . If no such set 
exists, the function cannot be satisfied, so return . 
Otherwise, compute as follows and return the result: 
 ''( 0 )
' ( 0 ),
' ( 0 ),( )
' ( 0 ),
,
. ( 0 )
. ( ( ))
. ( )
(0 )
( )
{ ( ) : }
,
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( , )
x x
i x
x
i S xz
x
i Sparent z x
x
i Sx x
x
x
S
x z
z S
r q
z S
r q index z
z S
r q i
z S
r q
i index z
index z z S
F F where S
e g g
e g g
e g g
e g g

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






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
 
Especially for root node R,  
(0)( , ) TrqA e g g ( , )r se g g   
Finally, /kC  ( ( , ) / )e C D A   
 /C  ( )( ( , ) /rse h g   ( , ) )r se g g   M signature  
Then, M signature  is sent to DR. 
Receiving M signature and MCert, DR implements the 
algorithm DecryptDR to finish data decryption. 
Lastly, DR removes the masked value in MM to get M. 
Algorithm 6. DecryptDR( M signature , MCert)→M 
DR retrieves the Cert to get related signatures, 
/ ( , ) ( , ) / ( , )D RID D RID D RIDt t tM C ert e g g C ert e g g e g g     
Cert  
Then, DR gets M with the signature, 
/M signature signature M   
3) User revocation 
An invalid DR is a DR who is thought to be malicious, or 
whose certificate is expired. The invalid DR should be 
revoked from the authorized access list. In MC-ABE, we can 
remove the MValue record in table 3 to revoke DR. First, TA 
modifies the revoked DR’s ‘Revocation’ item from ‘N’ to ‘Y’ 
in Mask Value Table. Second, the current signature must be 
updated to a new one. After these two steps, the invalid DR is 
revoked. When he requests new data, he will be taken as a 
newcomer (the signature is updated, and he does not have the 
new one), and TA will refuse his request since he is marked as 
revoked. For valid DR, they will get the new signature and 
access the system as usual.  
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Encryption and decryption outsource 
In this paper, M is masked by DO before it is sent to ESP. 
DO and authorized DR can get M. ESP and DSP can get MM 
(Masked M), but they can not deduce M from MM. 
Theorem 1: The security in encryption & decryption in 
MC-ABE is no weaker than that of CP-ABE. 
Proof: In algorithm EncryptESP, ESP encrypts the access 
tree T with the parameter s T and MM. 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )as as vC M e g g signature M e g g e g g       Using 
PK and s, ESP can get ( , )ase g g , what ESP gets 
is ( , ) vM e g g  . 
The encrypted data in CP-ABE is ( , )asC M e g g  , both 
of  and s are random, let z s  , z is also random, then 
( , )zC Me g g  is equal to ( , ) kvMe g g  . According to the 
security proof in [7]; the structure of ( , )asC M e g g  is secure 
to prevent the adversary from deducing M. Thus, 
( , ) kvMe g g  in our scheme is secure. That is to say, ESP can’t 
deduce M with ( , ) kvMe g g  , and encryption outsourcing is 
secure in MC-ABE. 
For DSP, it can decrypt CT using SK, and get the masked 
M= M signature . The information DSP gets is the same as 
ESP. So, in MC-ABE, data decryption outsourcing is also 
secure since it is similar to data encryption outsourcing. 
B. Revocation 
If a DR is revealed to be malicious, he will be revoked 
from the authorized user list. We update the signature 
encrypted in CT, after that, as shown in the following, the 
revoked DR can not get authorized data any more. 
Revoked signature held by DR: ( , ) kvsignature e g g   
Updated signature: '' ( , ) kvsignature e g g   
Masked M’= '' ( , ) kvM signature Me g g   
Masked ''/ ( , ) / ( , )k kv vM signature Me g g e g g    
 '( )( , ) k kv vMe g g    
Thus, MC-ABE is secure in revocation. 
Fig.3(a). DO’s computation cost for data 
encryption in CP-ABE, PP-CP-ABE and MC-
ABE. In PP-CP-ABE, part of encryption 
computation is transferred to cloud sever to 
reduce DO’s cost in MC-ABE. 
Fig.3(b). Computation cost of DO (The 95% 
confidence interval assuming random data with 
normal distribution is shown). 
Fig.3(c). Computation cost of key generation 
(The 95% confidence interval assuming 
random data with normal distribution is 
shown). 
 
Fig.3(d). Computation cost of DR in CP-ABE and 
MC-ABE. Similar to ESP in MC-ABE, DSP also 
undertake most of the computation in decryption. 
The cost is proportional to attributes number in 
private key. 
 
Fig.3(e). Computation cost for user revocation. 
With the authorization certificate in MC-ABE, 
revocation cost can be reduced obviously. 
 
 
TABLE IV.  CONFIDENCE INTERVAL  OF KEY 
GENERATION COMPUTATION COST 
Att_num CI Ave 
10 [11.909, 11.934] 11.922 
15 [18.543, 18.589] 18.566 
20 [25.127, 25.159] 25.143 
25 [31.652, 31.731] 31.691 
30 [38.265, 38.366] 38.316 
35 [44.869, 44.956] 44.912 
40 [51.455, 51.633] 51.544 
45 [58.04, 58.1582] 58.099 
50 [64.542, 64.678] 64.610 
The 95% confidence interval assuming random data 
with normal distribution is shown. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Numerical analysis 
The main computation cost in the scheme is 
computations in algorithms, the attribute number in a tree or 
SK is the key factor to influence the computation cost. 
Simulation results of computation cost in MC-ABE are 
shown in figure 3. The confidence interval is shown in table 
5 (Att_num indicates the number of DR’s attributes. CI 
indicates the confidence interval, and Ave indicates the 
average value).  
Compared to CP-ABE, more storage cost is incurred in 
MC-ABE because the certificate and the unique value are 
introduced. The items in certificates are related to data 
access privileges, so the storage space of the certificate is 
proportional to the number of the documents (data). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
How to keep data security and data privacy in C-BSN is 
an important and challenging issue since the patients’ 
health-related data is quite sensitive. In this paper, we 
propose a novel encryption outsourcing scheme MC-ABE 
that meets the requirements of data security and data privacy 
in C-BSN. In MC-ABE, one specific signature is 
constructed to mask the plaintext; the unique authentication 
certificate for each visitor is constructed; and, by 
performance evaluation, it shows that MC-ABE has less 
computation cost and storage cost compared with other 
popular models. In our future work, we plan to explore the 
possibility for improving the scalability of MC-ABE. 
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